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MARRIAGE IN RURAL PHILIPPINE HOUSEHOLDS
Robert E. Evenson
INTRODUCTION
Marriage decisions are influenced by tradition and culture. But they also
respond to economic factors. Delays in the age of marriage have been seen
as a means of controlling family size. Thus, factors influencing the desired
family size also influence age-at-marriage and the probability of marriage.
Marriage is also related to investments in skills and occupation choices.
There are at least three reasons for this relationship. First, skills and
occupational achievement may influence the "quality" of a marriage (the
qualities of the partner). Second, marriage may be competitive with skills
achievement in terms of time and resources. And third, marriage may
conflict with perceived "remittance" obligations to the family.
These economic motives are interrelated. Both parents and children in
households have a stake in the outcomes of marriages and, thus,'they weigh
in family decisions regarding them. Wb.en children are young, parents are
the dominant decisionmakers. They anticipate and project marriage, loca-
tion and occupational (and possibly fertility) outcomes for their children.
As children grow older, they develop commitments and responsibilities
congruent with parental projections -- including remittance income support
to the family. At some point their "individuality" emerges and they take
increasing responsibility for marriage and skills acquisition decisions. Both
parents and children recognize differences in innate abilities, tastes, and
attitudes toward risk, etc. In some cases, these differences produce conflict
and alienation; but in most families, parental flexibility regarding their412 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
expectations and their children's emerging expectations produces a harmo-
nious transition to the next generation.
Rural Philippine households are regarded to exhibit high degrees of
parental support for schooling and training, high degrees ofchild responsibility
regarding remittances and family support, and high degrees ofintergenerational
harmony. These family structures are based on traditions, and community and
religious values. In this paper, I propose to test the proposition that rural
Philippine families are also responsive to economic conditions as choices are
made regarding the schooling of children, marriage and age-at-marriage of
children, and the location and occupation choices of children.
I will utilize intergenerational survey data from a sample of rural
households in Laguna Province in the Philippines to test this proposition.
These households were originally surveyed in 1975, 1977; 1982, 1985, 1990
and 1992. The sample size was reduced over time as households aged. The
1992 survey sought data on marital Status, age-at-marriage, location and
occupational choice. By 1992, virtually all of the survey households had
completed childbearing, a large proportion ofthe children had completed
schooling and a substantial pi:oportion had married and chosen occupation
and location.
The second section (p. 412) of this paper discusses the economic
modelling of parental and child choices. The third part (p. 416) discusses
data and empirical specifications. The fourth part (p. 419) presents esti-
mates, which are subsequently summarized in theconclusion (p. 426).
THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT
Families ultimately make decisions regarding contraception and family
size, investment in schooling and related skills acquisition, location, occu-
pation and marriage. Parents make their own contraception decisions and
support early schooling investments in their children. They make these
decisions with certain projections and expectations in mind. Since children
contribute income to their families, particularly as they get older, this
contribution is quite important to families, since marriage typically indicatesEVENSON:MARRIAGEIN RURALPHILIPPINEHOUSEHOLDS 413
the formation of a new family andthe cessation of an income contribution
to parents(except for contributions to parents when they become elderly).
Thus, age-at-marriage decisions have importanteconomic implications for
the family.
The "household" model setup for this problem would be as follows:
The household utility function (1) would include child services Cl, child
humancapital/-_, leisuretO,age-at-marriage, _'_, and otherhousehold goods
Z.
n r/ n
_1 i=1 j t=l
At age _, orata related age, the child leaves this family to form a new
household. This does not preclude remittanCeS in later years, but it is
assumed that remittances after one has completed schooling end with
marriage. Note thatthe household has some optimal M_in mind. This may
be determined by community norms. Similarly, the utility from _ may be
influenced by community norms.
The constraints for this problem are cited below:
c_=o (xc_,iv,C,K) (2)
Child services require child goods Arc(food, shelter), child care time to ,
household capital K (which might include community capital as well) and
contraceptive effort C.
Hi= H_(Si, Hj) (3)
J
Human capital is produced by schooling S_,and health investments//,.
S_=Si(t_,x_,A_) (4)
Schooling is produced by time in school Tst,schooling goods X_i,and child
ability, Ai.
Hi-- Hj( ti),xm, K) (5)414 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Health is produced by child care time tij,health goods (medicine, etc.) and
household capital K.
Z= Z ( Xz, tzj,K) (6)
Other household goods are produced by market goods Xz, time t_j,and.
capital K.
Tj-- t¢ + ts) + tzj+ twj+ tO (7)
Each household member j, where j includes parents, faces a time
constraint. Total time tj is alloeated to childcare time t¢, time in school t_j,
time in home productiol_ tzj, time working twj,and leisure to
V+ _ twj(TMj) Wj :," _, (PcXci+PsX_i+PhXht)+PzXz (8)
,] i
The budget constraintis that family income in a particular period,
composed of nonlabor income Vand labor income (the sum of time spent
working byj members t,q times wage Wy. (adjusted for remittances associ-
ated with age-at-marriage) must be sufficient to pay for expenditures on
child goods (Xei, Xsi, Xhi) and other purchased goods used to produce
household goods Xz.
The;period over which the problem occurs is effectively the family life
cycle from marriage until the last child effectively leaves the household.
The relative weights of different family members in the household utility
function can be considered to shift over the life cycle as children play larger
roles. One way to visualize these weights is as being associated with "threat
points" in a bargaining model (Fabella 1983). This setup is not i_ended to
suggest that the children no longer care for their parents' welfare or that
they may make remittances B after they leave the household.
The time constraint (7) can be inserted into the budget constraint (8) to
form the "full income" constraint in the standard way. The shadow prices
or minimum costs of producing child services Ci, human capital Hi andEVENSON:MARRIAGE IN RURALPHILIPPINE HOUSEHOLDS 415
household goods can be expressed inthe standard way as weighted averages
of goods and time prices where the weights are goods and time intensities.
l/ci=_ WjtCCi+pJ:c,/CJ
J
llt-/_ =/I,t + lib,
Ilsi+ W_tsi/Si + PsXsi/Si





The family can then be seen to maximize (1) subject to the full income
constraint taking these prices and its full income into account. Note that
ability Aj, affects the shadow price of schooling 11sithrough a productivity
effect. Higher ability allows the same St to be attained with less time ts,, and
goods Xsi.
Age-at-marriage M_ affects both utility and income. Later ages-at-
mariage raise family income through remittances. For adult children, wages
are related to their own human capital. This could be seen as a reduction in
the shadow price of human capital (schooling), so age-at-marriage can be
seen as having both income and price effects.
This maximization problem yields the following "demand" relation-
ships:
1. the demand for number of children n, i.e., for contraception,
2. the demand for human capital per child tti(Si, H_),
3. the demand for other home goods Z,
4. the demand for purchased goods (Xc_, Xsi, Xn_,X_) and
5. time allocation decisions by family members tO,tsj,tzj,twj,tO.416 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
These behavioral relationships are, in principle, jointly determined by
the "'exogenous" variables of the problem:
C, contraceptive services and knowledge
K, household and community capital and infrastructure
A;, child abilityendowments
V, nonlabor income
Pc, Ps, Ph, Pz,•prices of market goods
Wj, market wages
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF MARRIAGE DECISIONS
In this paper, no attempt will be made to provide estimates of the full set of
relationships implied by the household model. The focus is on the marriage
decisions. And given the timing of the marriage decision and the shift in
utility weights between parents and children, a somewhat more restricted
model than the one developed above is needed.
The restricted model that I will use is a model in which the basic family
decisions (1 to 5), i.e., the family size, investments in human capital, and
the home goods, produced goods and time allocation decisions, are deemed
to have been made in the first stage of the family life cycle. Marriage
decisions are made in a second stage, and while these decisions were
anticipated and projected in the first stage, the actual investments in human
capital from the first stage can be taken as given in the second stage. This
logic supports the inclusion of schooling as a "lagged endogenous" ex-
planatory variable.
•In addition, the empirical specification of estimates of determinants of
age-at-marriage must deal with a censoring problem. In the survey data,
second generation children range in age from preschoolers to children in
I
their 30s (in 1992). Some have not completed schoohng and many who have
completed schooling have not married. The subsample of married children
is a censored sample, even if an age cut-off iSused. That is, if we consider
children over 21, we have asubsample that is not censored as regards the
Schooling decision since almost all children over 21 have completed schoo- ,iEVENSON: MARRIAGEIN RURAL PHILIPPINEHOUSEHOLDS 417
ling. But many will not have married for reasons similar to the reasons for
marrying at different ages.
Accordingly, in this paper, an age cut-off(over 21) is used to eliminate
censoring from schooling decisions. A two-stage selection bias procedure
(Heckman 1981) is used to correct for censoring bias in age-at-marriage
estimates. In the first stage, a "probit" estimate of determinants of marriage
is estimated. In the second, the determinants of age-at-marriage are esti-
mated utilizing mills ratio terms from the first stage probit requirements to
correct for censoring or selecti,,qty bias (actually, the procedure utilized
estimates in both stages jointly in a maximum likelihood procedure).
Table 1 provides a short definition of the variables utilized in this
analysis. The two key endogenous variables are the EVER MARRIED and
AGE-AT-MARRIAGE variables. However, a secondary analysis of mar-
riage and migration from the home community (barangay) to elsewhere in
the Philippines or abroad is also conducted. The four variables, MAR-
RIED/MIGRATED, NOT MARRIED/MIGRATED, MARRIED/NOT
MIGRATED, NOT MARRIED/NOT MIGRATED, show the marriage-mi-
gration pattern.
Individual characteristics include SEX, AGE, and schooling (EDUC).
The EDUC variable is treated as a lagged endogenous variable.
Maternal characteristics include mother's schooling, MEDUC, and
mother's age at marriage, MAGEMARR, as well as an indicator of early
death of the mother, MDECEASED. These variables are intended to reflect
home management skills as well as the socializing influences of the mother.
Household characteristics include farm size and distance to the nearest
market, DIST POB.
Community characteristics include indexes of transactions costs,
TRANS COST, transportation, TRANSPORTATION, and the mean agri-
cultural wages for the 1977-90 period, COMMUNITY WAGE.
These community characteristics influence migration and occupational
choice (Evenson 1994 and King 1982). It is expected that the more remote
barangays with high transportation costs will encourage family enterprises,418 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 1




EVER MARRIED: Dummy= 1 ifmarried 0.41 0.54
AGE-AT-MARRIAGE: Age married = 1 if married 23.40 21.70
MARRIED/MIGRATED: Dummy = 1 if married 0,19 0.26
and migrated
NOT MARRIED/MIGRATED: Dummy = 1 if not 0.57 0.45
married and migrated
MARRIED/NOT MIGRATED: Dummy = 1 if married 0.20 0.25
and not migrated
NOT MARRIED/NOT MIGRATED: Dummy= 1 if not 0,04 0.04
married and not migrated
ExogenousVariables
Individual Characteristics
SEX:Dummy= 1 ifmale 1.00 0,00
AGE: Age ofsecondgeneration respondent 28,50 28,60
EDUC: Yearsschooling completed 7,32 8,71
Mother'sCharacteristics
MEDUC:Yearsofschooling completedbymother 4.51 4,56
MAGEMARR:Mother'sage-at-marriage 19,40 19,40
MDECEASED:Dummy= 1 ifmotherdeceasedin 0.027 0,042
1992
HouseholdCharacteristics
FARM SIZE: Farmed cropland (ownedor rented) 1.36 1.35
in hectares
Community Characteristics
TRANS COSTS:Transactions cost index 2.21 2.22
TRANSPORTATION:Transportation index 2.15 2.22
COMMUNITYWAGE: Average community 28.44 28.58
agricultural dailywage (1977- 1990)
in pesos, EVENSON: MARRIAGE INRURAL PHILIPPINE HOUSEHOLDS 421
TABLE3
Selectivity Corrected Estimates: Probabilityof Marriage


























FARM SIZE 0.032 0,151
(0,66) (0.76)
FARM SIZE (MALE) -0,0002 -0.608





TRANS COST 0.225 0.008
(1,84) (0.02)














Ob > Chi2 0.000
equation for age-at-marriage are jointly estimated using a maximum likeli-
hood technique. The age-at-marriage estimates are thus corrected for the
selectivity bias inherent in the marriage decisions.
For this procedure, observations for sons and daughters are pooled.
However, separate coefficients for sons and daughters are estimated for
most of the important variables (the interactions with the sex = 1 if male
dummy, mean that the coefficient for the uninteracted variable is the
coefficient for daughters. The coefficient for sons is the sum &the uninter-EVENSON:MARRIAGEIN RURALPHILIPPINEHOUSEHOLDS 423
acted variable and the interacted variable). It is expected that most variables
affecting the probability of marriage will also affect age-at-marriage. Age
of the respondent is the key variable used to identify the model as it does
not appear in the age-at-marriage equation. (Strictly speaking, the model
could be identified by the "functional form" of the probit -- but most
economists argue for more identifying variables.)
For the most part, the probit estimates for the probability of marriage
are approximately as reported in the simple probits. By comparing the probit
estimates with the age-at-marriage estimates, however, we can obtain more
insights into the process. In some eases, we expect the higher probability of
marriage to be achieved through lowering the age-at-marriage. For exam-
ple, it was noted in the discussion of Table 2 that the education of both sons
and. daughters increased the probability of marriage. But for daughters,
education increased age-at-marriage -- i.e., caused them to marry later --
while, for sons, education led to earlier age-at-marriage. Yet for both sons
and daughters, education led to higher probabilities of marriage given the
respondent's age and other characteristics.
Interestingly, the education level of the mother has the opposite effect
for sons. More educated mothers have little effect on the marriage patterns
of their daughters. But they do induce their sons to marry later, and this
produces a net reduction in the probability of marriage for this group. (It is
likely, however, that marriage probabilities will go up asthis group gets older.
The same comment applies to daughters with higher schooling levels.)
Mother's age-at-marriage does not appear to have an impact on the
daughter's marriage pattern. There is some indication that sons marry later
if their mothers married later. Early death of the mother leads to higher
probabilities of marriage.
The size of the farm operation apears to have little effect on the marriage
probability but does appear to lead to earlier age-at-marriage for sons. The
opportunity to farm appears to lead to lower out-migration and earlier
marriage. (See next section for further discussion.)
t. As noted in the ealier discussion, high transaction costs in the home
community lead to higher marriage probabilities for daughters, but this is424 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
not achieved through an impact on age-at-marriage. Better transportation
facilities in the home community also appear to lead to higher marriage
probabilities for daughters, and these are achieved via earlier age-at-
marriage. The effect of higher agricultural wages is similar.
MARRIAGE AND MIGRATION: AN EXTENSION
Marriage is related to migration. As noted earlier, most of the second
generation children who have not migrated from their home barangay (and
associated town) have in fact married at a relatively young age. One can
imagine a number of links between migration and marriage. Education is
acquired to enhance earning opportunities for children who do not plan to
migrate. But for many families, educational investments are made to facili-
tate migration and to enhance earning opportunities after migration. The
marriage decision is also related to this. Migration, on the one hand, expands
the scope for finding marriage partners as does education. Marriage after
migration is thus likely to occur at a later age than is marriage without
migration.
A simple probit procedure is not suited to analyzing thejoint marriage-
migration decision. The multinomial logit procedure does allow us, how-
ever, to assess the effects of the various independent variables in this
analysis on multiple choices relative to a reference choice. Table 4 reports
multinomial logit estimates for a three-choice model, where the choices are --
1. Not migrating (the reference choice)
2. Migrating-married
3. Migrating-not married
The determining variables are the same as those determining the probit
choice of marrying or not marrying. Since most of the nonmigrating children
have actually married, it is not possible to consider the not migrating-not
married choice.
The estimated coefficients thus tell us something about both the decision
to migrate and the decision to marry, given that migration has taken place.EVENSON: MARRIAGE IN RURAL PHILIPPINE HOUSEHOLDS 425
TABLE4
Multinomial Logit Regression Estimates: Probabilityof Marriage
and Migration: Son and Daughter Second Generation Respondents
in Laguna
Sons Daughters
Migrated Migrated Migrated Migrated
married not married not
married married
Constant -2.82 -5.34 -5.64 -9.15
(1.46) (2.52) (2.31) (3.73)
Individual Characteristics
AGE 0.175 0.175 1.56 0.156
(5.23) (4.79) (4,39) (4.34)
EDUC 0.190 0.333 0.064 0.116
(3.84) (5.86) (1.42) (2.55)
Mother'sCharacteristics
MEDUC -0,238 -0.017 -0.075 -0,016
(3.21) (0.23) (0.97) (0,23)
MAGEMARR -0.127 -0.035 -0.183 -0,084
(2.33) (0.65) (2.98) (1,46)
MDECEASED 1.58 1.49 1.36 0.162
(1.53) (1,36) (1.56) (0.15)
Household Characteristics
FARM SIZE 0.159 -0.717 0.064 0.104
(1,50) (1.15) (0.52) (0.97)
Community Characteristics
TRANS COSTS -0.184 -0.325 0.568 0,532
(0.48) (1.26) (2.10) (2.01)
CommunityWAGE -0.010 -0.039 0.108 0.142
(0.27) (0.96) (2:35) (3.12)
Observations 285.000 253.000
Chi2 107.400 62.200
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000
PseudoR2 0.177 0.113426 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
First, consider the effects of age. Itappears that age increases migration.
Older children are more likely to have migrated than the reference group.
• ge appears to have little differential effect on marriage.
Education also affects migration and marriage. More educated children
more likely to have migrated..They are also more likely to migrate and
_tmarry than the reference group.
More educated mothers appear to stimulate their sons to migrate and
arty. But this is not the ease for their daughters.
Mothers who marry later have lower migration probabilities and mar-
tge probabilities for both sons and daughters.
Early deaths of mothers tend to stimulate migration and marriage.
Larger farm sizes do not have strong effects.
Higher transaction costs and higher local wages stimulate migration of
daughters, but have little impart on sons.
SUMMARY
The data available for second generation sons and daughters allow us to
draw some conclusions regarding the effect of several variables measuring
individual, maternal, household and home community characteristics on
marriage probabilities and age-at-marriage. Since this is an age truncated
sample, i.e., not all sons and daughters have completed marriage decisions,
the reader is cautioned regarding conclusions on probabilities of ever
marrying. In cases where age-at-marriage is delayed, current probabilities
of being married may be lower as a result, but this may not hold for
probabilities of ever marrying. The reverse may be the case for factors
accelerating age-at-marriage.
The evidence on marriage based on moderate levels of statistical
significance (t > 1.5) suggests the following conclusions.
Higher levels of educational attainment by sons increase the marriage
probability by accelerating age-at-marriage. For daughters, marriage pro-
babilities are also increased, but age-at-marriage is delayed. For both sons /EVENSON:MARRIAGEIN RURALPHILIPPINEHOUSEHOLDS 427
and daughters, higher educational attainment is associated with higher
marriage opportunities via migration from the home community.
Higher levelsofmaternaleducationalattainment,onthe otherhand,appear
to have littleeffect onthe marriageoutcomes of daughters,For sons, marriage
is delayed andmigration is increasedby higher levels of maternal education.
Early deaths of mothers stimulate higher levels of marriage.
Availability of farm land (hence farming opportunities) has little effect
on daughter's marriage outcomes. It encourages earlier marriages for sons
anddiscourages migration.
Home community characteristics have little effect on the marriage
outcomes of sons. For daughters, high transactions costs stimulate higher
marriage probabi!ities and migration. High agricultural wages have similar
effects. Better transportation options also have similar effects.
Most of these measured effects are predicted by the economic logic of
the household model -- although little modeling of marriage has actually
been undertaken. If there is a surprise in these estimates, it is that marriage
opportunities for daughters are apparently more circumscribed by commu-
nity and household factors than aremarriage opportunities for sons. Maternal
characteristics have stronger effects on sons. And while farming opportuni-
ties hold sons in the local community and encourage early marriage, high
transactions costs and employment opportunities do so for daughters.t28 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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